The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (March 2012)

Occasional Paper 94, March 2012

European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs

You can read the full report here.

US Supreme Court: FISHER. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–345. Argued October 10, 2012—Decided June 24, 2013

The University of Texas at Austin considers race as one of various fac­tors in its undergraduate admissions process. The University, which is committed to increasing racial minority enrollment, adopted its current program after this Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, upholding the use of race as one of many “plus factors” in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contri­bution of each candidate, and decided Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, holding unconstitutional an admissions program that automati­cally awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities. Petitioner, who is Caucasian, was rejected for admission to the University’s 2008 entering class. She sued the University and school officials, alleging that the University’s consideration of race in admis­sions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment to the University. Affirming, the Fifth Circuit held that Grutter required courts to give substantial defer­ence to the University, both in the definition of the compelling inter­est in diversity’s benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Applying that standard, the court upheld the University’s admissions plan. (... full text)

IMF: GREECE: EX POST EVALUATION OF EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS UNDER THE 2010 STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT

June 2013, International Monetary Fund
IMF Country Report No. 13/156

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The primary objective of Greece’s May 2010 program supported by a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was to restore market confidence and lay the foundations for sound medium-term growth through strong and sustained fiscal consolidation and deep structural reforms, while safeguarding financial sector stability and reducing the risk of international systemic spillovers. Greece was to stay in the euro area and an estimated 20-30 percent competitiveness gap would be addressed through wage adjustment and productivity gains.

There were notable successes during the SBA-supported program (May 2010–March 2012). Strong fiscal consolidation was achieved and the pension system was put on a viable footing. Greece remained in the euro area, which was its stated political preference. Spillovers that might have had a severe effect on the global economy were relatively well-contained, aided by multilateral efforts to build firewalls.

However, there were also notable failures. Market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30 percent of its deposits, and the economy encountered a much-deeper-than-expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment. Public debt remained too high and eventually had to be restructured, with collateral damage for bank balance sheets that were also weakened by the recession. Competitiveness improved somewhat on the back of falling wages, but structural reforms stalled and productivity gains proved elusive.

Given the danger of contagion, the report judges the program to have been a necessity, even though the Fund had misgivings about debt sustainability. There was, however, a tension between the need to support Greece and the concern that debt was not sustainable with high probability (a condition for exceptional access). In response, the exceptional access criterion was amended to lower the bar for debt sustainability in systemic cases. The baseline still showed debt to be sustainable, as is required for all Fund programs. In the event, macro outcomes were far below the baseline and while some of this was due to exogenous factors, the baseline macro projections can also be criticized for being too optimistic.

The report considers the broad thrust of policies under the program to have been appropriate. Rapid fiscal adjustment was unavoidable given that the Greece had lost market access and official financing was as large as politically feasible. Competiveness-boosting measures were also essential, as were fiscal structural reforms to support deficit reduction. However, the depth of ownership of the program and the capacity to implement structural reforms were overestimated.

Greece’s SBA suggests the need to explore the case for refining the Fund’s lending policies and framework to better accommodate the circumstances of monetary unions. A particular challenge is to find ways to translate promises of conditional assistance from partner countries into formal program agreements.

There are also political economy lessons to be learned. Greece’s recent experience demonstrates the importance of spreading the burden of adjustment across different strata of society in order to build support for a program. The obstacles encountered in implementing reforms also illustrate the critical importance of ownership of a program, a lesson that is common to the findings of many previous EPEs.

Other lessons drawn concern the need to find ways to streamline the Troika process in the future and for Fund staff to be more skeptical about official data during regular surveillance. The detailed nature of the structural fiscal conditionality in the Greek program also bears scrutiny given the premium attached to parsimony in Fund conditionality.  (...Full report)

Comparison of salaries of University Professors around the world

This is the best information available I have found, so far.  

• Introduction
• Information on salaries across countries
• Average gross salaries
• Salaries adjusted to the cost of living
• Salaries compared to GDP per capita
• Salary progression by experience and gender
• References

• Salaries in economics in US academia 2010-11 (dedicated page)

 

Introduction

The following sections present comparative data on salaries. After some general obervations about the relation between salaries and the organisation of university systems in different countries, we provide figures for different countries in absolute terms, adjusted to the cost of living and compared to GDP per capita. We also show salary progression by experience and gender.
These sections are constantly being updated with new information, given the wide interest in salary issues. As with all the ACO web pages, we invite you to send us comments and useful information and links on salaries in academia. To comment contact us by email.
 

Information on salaries across countries

Comparing salaries across countries requires some preliminary observations. Salary levels vary both across and within countries. Depending on national legislation and university governance, salary levels can be either fixed rigidly by the state or decided by universities.
In 2007, Bruegel calculated 'setting autonomy' by ten European countries and assigned values between 0 and 1. Many countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Switzerland) had no autonomy (0). Sweden was the country with the highest autonomy (1), and The Netherlands (0.2), Denmark (0.5) and the UK (0.8) are located in between. The total for the ten European was 0.3 (Bruegel, 2007: 5).
Another issue is salary dispersion. There may be significant variations of salary at entry-level positions in universities in systems where universities are more or less free to set their own wages. Even within the same system salaries may vary according to seniority and/or merit. In systems where salaries progress mainly with seniority this progression is visible and can be measured. This is not true in those countries where salaries are fixed according to merit (e.g. record of publications).
In liberalised systems where universities are free to set their own wages, salary growth can be influenced not only by the dynamics of internal competition in the academic market, but also by external competition by non-academic agents, including private economic actors.
Overall, we can say that salaries are higher in systems where either 1) universities are autonomous, compete in the academic market and use salaries to attract and build a strong faculty, or 2) the state fixes high salaries. The UK and the US are typical examples of the first model. Switzerland is a good example of the second model. Universities from these three countries also dominate in the Shangai system for ranking universities.
 

Average gross salaries

The table below provides a comparison of avarage gross salaries across countires. Titles of academic positions differ form country to country but for means of comparison we have unified them into five categories. In countries where the position or its equivalent does not exist, the space is left blank. For more information on salaries as well as the start and maximum salary level, follow the link to the individual country pages.
Note that Ph.D. Candidate is included as a position, even though it is mostly in the Scadinavian countries that Ph.D. Candidates are considered employees with contractual rights equivalent to other academic positions.

 

Average Gross Salaries, €/month
PhD	Postdoc	Junior Lecturer/ Assistant Professor	Senior Lecturer/ Associate Professor	Full Professor
Belgium (2007)	--	--	4.318	5.138	6.625
Canada (2007)	--	--	4.856	6.096	7.145
Denmark (2007)	3.152	4.560	--	5.499	6.974
Finland (2007)	2.290	3.220	--	3.420	5.218
France (2007)	--	2.500	--	3.000	4.500
Germany (2007)	--	--	3.277	3.744	4.546
Ireland (2004)	--	--	5.250	6.400/7.700*	9.750
Israel (2007)	--	--	2.650	3.029/3.597*	4.733
Italy (2004)	--	1.500	2.500	4.000	5.500
Netherlands (2004)	--	--	3.974	5.541	6.544
Norway (2005)	3.203	3.950	--	4.330	5.297
Poland (2006/2007)	--	--	586	1.127	1.758
Russia (2007)	250	--	--	600**	900/1.100***
Spain (2003)	--	1.584	2.250	2.750	3.584
Sweden (2006)	2.365	3.317	3.142	3.800	5.145
UK (2007)	--	3.813	4.766	5.842	6.353
Ukraine (2006)	50	100	200	400	1.000
USA (2006)	--	3.708	4.820	5.785	8.529

 

* These figures refer to respectively 'senior lecturer' and 'associate professor' positions.
** This figure refers to the undifferentiated 'lecturer' position.
** These figures refer to respectively the 'professor' and 'chair' positions.

 

All figures are gross. For taxing comparisons see: http://www.oecd.org. All countries provide different social benefits, social security, child care, family allowance, etc, to their citizens.
The salaries are provided by institutions or ministries in the respective countries.
For more detailed information salary levels see the individual country links.
Note that in the different countries there are various ways to top the salary with bonuses and other means of income. This is especially true in the case of Spain and the U.S. where the salaries comparatively seem very low, but the actual salary can be much higher depending on the productivity and outside activities of the individual.
 

Salaries adjusted to the cost of living  

In April 2007 the European Commission published a comparison of researchers salaries across Europe, based on an online survey. The following chart gives the average salaries adjusted to the cost of living in each country:

Average weighted total yearly salary per countries (2006 in €) 

Country	Average weighted total yearly salary adjusted	Country	Average weighted total yearly salary adjusted
Austria	62.406	Latvia	10.488
Belgium	58.462	Lithuania	13.851
Bulgaria	3.556	Luxembourg	63.865
Croatia	16.671	Malta	28.078
Cyprus	45.039	Netherlands	59.103
Czech Republic	19.620	Norway	58.997
Denmark	61.355	Poland	11.659
Estonia	11.748	Portugal	29.001
Finland	44.635	Romania	6.286
France	50.879	Slovakia	9.178
Germany	56.132	Slovenia	27.756
Greece	25.685	Spain	34.908
Hungary	15.812	Sweden	56.053
Iceland	50.803	Switzerland	82.725
Ireland	60.727	Turkey	16.249
Israel	42.552	United Kingdom	56.048
Italy	36.201

 

Source: European Commission, 2007: 43.

The report found bropad differences between salaries in the EU and associated countries, which however were reduced once salaries were adjusted to the cost of living in each country. As expected, countries with a high cost of living were those that paid researchers better. Low-medium salary levels were reported in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region, while high-very high salaries were paid in Central Europe and the Nordic countries.
A few countries (Austria, The Netherlands, Israel, Switzerland and Luxembourg) offered avarage salaries in line with the U.S. considering the cost of living.
Other countries outside the EU (Australia, India, Japan) all have average higher remuneration than the EU-25 area considering the cost of living. In Australia and Japan salaries are similar to those of the U.S. The only country in which the average salary was well below the EU was China.
See the report for further info
 

Salaries compared to GDP per capita

The ratio between the average salary for researchers and the average GDP per capita (adjusted to the cost of living) varies from country to country. Data show different degrees of investment on research by different countries. For example, with declining values Japan, the UK and the US all provide researchers with salaries higher than their country GDP per capita. Spain and Sweden pay around the same as the average GDP, and Italy pays less.



Click here to see the graph

Salary progression by experience and gender

The table draws on the Commission's study and reports researchers' annual salary average in the EU and associated countries by gender and years of experience.
The table draws on the Commission's study and reports researchers' annual salary average in the EU and associated countries by gender and years of experience.

Total country annualy salary of researchers in EU25 and associated countries, by gender and level of experience (2006, all currencies in purchasing power parities)
 

Country/years of experience (by gender)	0-4 y. Female Male	5-7 y. Female Male	8-10 y. Female Male	11-15 y. Female Male	>15 y. Female Male
Austria	34.473    37.244	41.921     50.446	49.369     63.648	56.817     76.850	64.266     90.052
Belgium	27.767 26.802	35.079 40.933	42.392 55.064	49.705 69.195	57.018 83.326
Bulgaria	2.045 1.961	2.668 2.689	3.292 3.417	3.915 4.144	4.539 4.872
Croatia	9.862 9.458	12.665 12.124	15.468 15.541	18.270 19.922	21.073 25.537
Cyprus	22.234 21.208	28.051 32.147	33.867 43.086	39.684 54.025	45.500 64.964
Czech Republic	7.478 10.728	10.792 15.015	14.105 19.301	17.419 23.587	20.733 27.874
Denmark	43.117 42.852	51.460 52.204	59.804 61.556	68.147 70.908	76.490 80.260
Estonia	4.825 7.691	6.939 10.068	7.636 12.444	8.334 14.821	9.053 17.198
Finland	23.369 28.886	29.776 36.724	36.182 44.563	42.589 52.401	48.996 60.239
France	30.223 30.726	38.859 39.225	47.494 50.075	56.129 63.926	64.765 81.608
Germany	22.143 25.716	35.969 38.731	49.795 51.746	63.621 64.761	77.447 77.776
Greece	13.462 11.823	19.131 18.370	24.800 24.917	30.469 31.464	36.138 38.011
Hungary	6.902 10.706	10.152 13.244	13.401 15.783	16.650 18.322	19.899 20.861
Iceland	45.664 44.713	50.070 50.073	52.273 55.432	54.475 60.792	58.881 66.152
Ireland	26.428 20.290	39.691 41.073	52.954 61.856	66.217 82.639	79.480 103.422
Israel	16.329 13.523	22.407 20.453	28.486 30.933	34.564 46.783	40.643 70.754
Italy	12.244 12.760	19.777 23.488	27.310 34.216	34.844 44.944	42.377 55.672
Latvia	12.000 -	14.667 -	17.335 -	20.002 -	22.670 -
Lithuania	7.356 6.836	8.286 9.068	9.216 11.299	10.146 13.531	11.076 15.763
Luxembourg	24.742 43.578	40.365 53.864	55.988 64.150	71.611 74.436	87.234 84.722
Malta	24.364 21.364	27.267 23.746	30.169 26.393	33.071 29.336	35.974 32.606
Netherlands	22.518 31.921	35.655 47.095	48.792 62.269	61.929 77.443	75.066 92.617
Norway	49.031 52.829	54.174 58.346	59.316 63.864	64.459 69.381	69.602 74.898
Poland	5.921 8.453	8.088 10.166	10.255 12.226	12.421 14.703	14.588 17.682
Portugal	10.512 12.051	14.693 17.541	20.535 25.532	28.702 37.164	40.115 54.095
Romania	3.813 2.476	4.696 4.474	5.785 6.473	7.126 8.472	8.778 10.471
Slovakia	5.547 5.895	6.794 7.187	8.041 8.762	9.287 10.681	10.534 13.021
Slovenia	16.424 17.976	22.502 22.372	28.581 27.844	34.659 34.654	40.737 43.130
Spain	16.416 17.228	22.858 22.955	29.300 30.586	35.742 40.754	42.184 54.301
Sweden	28.591 28.012	41.900 42.655	55.209 57.298	68.518 71.941	81.827 86.584
Sweden	28.591 28.012	41.900 42.655	55.209 57.298	68.518 71.941	81.827 86.584
Switzerland	39.599 40.862	55.711 61.075	71.823 81.288	87.935 101.501	104.047 121.714
Turkey	7.674 8.634	10.707 11.387	13.740 15.016	16.773 19.803	19.806 26.116
United Kingdom	25.411 29.060	37.461 38.608	49.511 51.293	61.561 68.146	73.611 90.536

 

Source: European Commission, 2007: 47

Here too the report found wide differences between countries. For example, in the UK one can expect a high progression moving from the first (0-4) to the last (>15) stage of the career stages considered by the report. At the same time, Denmark offers higher salaries already in the first stage but progression is limited (around 90%) compared to the UK (around 235%).
Women earn less than men, with significant differences in all the countries. In some (Estonia, Czech Republic, Israel and Portugal) the gap is above 35%. In others (Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Malta) it is below 15%.
See the report for more info.
 

Bibliography

Bruegel (2007), 'Why Reform Europe's Universities?', Policy Brief Series, 2007/04.
European Commission (2007), Study on the Remuneration of Researchers in the Public and Private Commercial Sectors (pdf).

Salaries in Economics in US Academia 2010-11

 

• Introduction
• Salaries of tenure-track academic economists by degree-granting institution
• Salaries of Associate and Full Professors at PhD-granting institutions
• Employment conditions for new Assistant Professors
• References

 

Introduction

The American academic market for young economists is undoubtedly the most interesting and sought after. Salary packages are competitive in most universities, and not necessarily in the top-ranked ones.
Each year, The American Economic Association sends out to selected institutions the Universal Academic Questionnaire (UAQ), an annual survey of US economics departments. The American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings includes a few tables assembled from the latest UAQ responses. Even though the accuracy of these results depends on the willingness of individual departments to collaborate, it is, nonetheless, a good indication of the working conditions to be expected in the American job market for economists.
All the figures in the tables below refer to academic-year salaries (calendar-year salaries are converted into academic-year salaries by multiplying by 0.818) and in USD. 1 USD = 0.734 Euros on 28 September 2011. The number of surveyed institutions is indicated in round parentheses; satndard deviations for salaries in square parentheses.
 

Salaries of tenure-track academic economists by degree-granting institution

The US academic market for economics is highly segmented and either focuses on teaching activities (institutions granting mainly BA and MA degrees) or on research activities as well (most institutions granting PhD degrees).
The Table below shows the salaries of tenured faculty at different institutions, based on the highest degree awarded in economics. Of course, universities granting research-based degrees (PhD) attract the most talented economists and offer the best salary packages.

US academic-year salaries of tenure-track academic economists
(2010-11)

	Full Prof	Associate Prof	Assistant Prof
PhD Institutions	$159,816 (76) [$41,772]	$117,231 (76) [$30,821]	$100,451 (83) [$13,471]
MA Institutions	$106,953 (33) [$14,998]	$84,803 (31) [$12,429]	$79,492 (40) [$11,743]
BA Institutions	$103,262 (148) [$23,987]	$80,382 (30) [$14,571]	$74,677 (37) [$15,393]

Salaries of Associate and Full Professors at PhD-granting institutions

The National Research Council (NRC) rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into tiers. The top three tiers include:

• Tier 1 (ranked 1-6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford and Yale;
• Tier 2 (ranked 7-15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Rochester, California-Berkeley, UCLA, and Wisconsin-Madison;
• Tier 3 (ranked 16-30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell, Duke, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan State, New York University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia, California-San Diego, University of Washington, and Washington University-St. Louis.

Not unsurprisingly, as the Table below shows, the lower Tier (lower numbers), the lower the average salary.

US academic-year salaries of tenure-track Associate and Full Professors in PhD granting universities by NRC Tiers (2010-11)

	Full Prof	Associate Prof
Tiers 1-2 (ranks 1-15)	$224,010 (6) [$47,750]	$151,417 (5) [$46,188]
Tier 3 (ranks 16-30)	$180,518 (8) [$29,605]	$133,932 (8) [$34,314]
Tier 4 (ranks 31-48)	$171,024 (9) [$38,446]	$131,678 (9) [$27,492]
Tier 5 (ranks 49+)	$140,714 (45) [$26,216]	$104,758 (42) [$17,791]

Employment conditions for new Assistant Professors

The Table below provides a fuller description of the employment conditions of newly hired Assistant Professors at US academic institutions offering different degrees in economics. In addition to the salary, compensations include: guaranteed summer compensation (over all years), other cash benefits to employees, such as a signing bonus. They do not include fringe benefits, moving expenses, computer that remains the property of the institution. Finally, the Table also summarizes the teaching load for each new Assistant Professor (courses per year), which is inversely correlated to the highest degree on offer.

Employment conditions for new Assistant Professors (2010-11)

	Salary	Add. compensation	Teaching load
PhD Institutions	$111,878 (83) [$28,422]	$39,378 (81) [$21,423]	3.5 (86) [2.4]
MA Institutions	$83,834 (26) [$10,659]	$14,333 (7) [$10,571]	4.6 (35) [0.7]
BA Institutions	$73,431 (10) [$12,660]	$4,214 (9) [$2,644]	5.8 (11) [1.4]

References

Scott, C. S. and Siegfried, J. J. (2011): “American Economic Association Universal Academic Questionnaire Summary Statistics”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 101 (664–667).