Friday, August 02, 2013

Spain attempts to reform the higher education and research system

Source: http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/spain-grapples-with-reform-of-stagnant-system/1/2006038.article

Next month Antonio Cabrales will leave his homeland with a heavy heart. Unlike others departing recession-hit Spain, the professor of economics at Carlos III University of Madrid is not emigrating for purely economic reasons.

Although a 20 per cent real terms pay cut recently imposed on Spain’s academics may have hastened Cabrales’ departure, he says that his main reason for moving to University College London, where he takes up a new post in September, is Spain’s stagnant university system.

Cabrales, who boasts a formidable record in teaching and research, says he believes that Spain’s academy offers few incentives or rewards for its most talented and hard-working academics.

With professorial salaries largely controlled by the state, there is “little difference [in pay] between someone who is extremely productive and someone who does nothing”, Cabrales claims.

“That is why I’m leaving to come to the UK. I’ve been waiting for 20 years for things to change, but I’ve stopped waiting.”

In fact, moves are finally afoot to address some of the issues troubling Cabrales.

A panel of experts appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is the Cabinet of the federal government, delivered its long-awaited review of Spanish higher education earlier this year. It proposes major reforms to university governance, academic pay and research funding.

It was commissioned to address widespread concern that almost two decades of heavy state investment in higher education had failed to yield significant results.

Not a single Spanish university features in the top 200 of the Times Higher Education World University Rankings, and no Spanish citizen has won a Nobel prize in the sciences in the past 100 years.

“Spain has thrown a lot of money at research,” observes Luis Garicano, professor of economics and strategy at the London School of Economics and a member of the higher education review panel.

“There has been a ton of cash spent on infrastructure – Spanish laboratories and university buildings are much bigger and better than those at UK universities.

“We also spent money on attracting talent from abroad, but we are now in a moment of massive financial constraint.”

What the country’s sector needs now is not large-scale investment but rather fundamental reforms of universities, Garicano argues.

Taking executive power out of the hands of academics and giving it to smaller, UK-style university councils is one of the panel’s key recommendations.

“The only way to succeed as a president at the moment is to allow people not to work,” insists Garicano, who says that Spanish rectors avoid making tough decisions because they will be voted out if they become unpopular with staff.

Under a new structure proposed by the expert panel, rectors would not be elected by staff and students. They would instead be chosen by a slimmed-down university council (a maximum of 25 members in contrast to 40-plus members under the current system), of which only half would be academics from the institution. At present, nearly all university governors are academics.

A quarter of council members would be “distinguished individuals with no political ties” selected by regional governments, which provide a large proportion of higher education funding. Others would be business leaders or academics from other institutions chosen by the governing board.

Centralising executive power in the hands of university rectors is seen as a way to allow them to tackle weaknesses in the Spanish system, such as the issue of the absentee academics who still draw a full professorial salary.

At many institutions, highly paid lawyers and politicians who began their professional life in the academy remain on the payroll but contribute little to academic life, says Garicano.

“It’s old-fashioned absenteeism. Several ministers in Spain are full professors because it’s a very prestigious role, but [they] will never teach or publish anything,” he adds.

Rectors would also be empowered to pay higher salaries to high-flying or especially dedicated professors who choose to opt out of the civil-servant status traditionally held by academics.

This route would allow universities to reduce the red tape, including a lengthy accreditation process, that has prevented Spanish universities from hiring the best academics from across the world, Garicano claims.

“If Albert Einstein had applied to a Spanish university after his seminal 1905 research papers, he could not have been appointed professor – that is still true today,” Garicano says of the arcane box-ticking required to achieve tenure.

“You could have the best scientist in the world and they could not get a professorial post in Spain.”


Panel moots REF-style assessment


Allied with plans to give universities more autonomy and flexibility, the review panel recommends the introduction of a funding model similar to the UK’s research excellence framework to reward world-class research and provide accountability for research expenditure.

“There are some outstanding academics doing great research, but they are fighting the system,” Garicano argues.

“As it stands, you have a lot of academics doing pretend research, writing papers no one will ever read to achieve their numbers, and not doing any teaching either,” he explains.

Introducing a more competitive method of funding research would inevitably mean that some universities receive more money than others – a system likely to create about “four or five world-class universities and a lot of very good teaching universities”, Garicano predicts.

“It is very much against the egalitarian spirit of the country, where every university has to be the same,” he acknowledges.

But will ministers kick the commission’s provocative recommendations into the long grass as the government seeks to deal with the country’s dire economic situation?

Garicano thinks that unlikely, believing that austerity has only strengthened arguments for his panel’s proposals to promote, attract and retain Spain’s most talented academics.

“What happens now is you fire all the people who are young and good but on short-term contracts, while all the people who have been there for ever keep their jobs,” he explains.

“There is no merit involved in these austerity cuts.”

Highly rated young scientists trained at top US universities who returned to Spain under its early career programme have been particularly hard hit by budget cuts, says Cabrales.

“Postdoctoral researchers also want to come back to Spain, but there is no possibility of it,” he adds.

“One of the best young physicists in Europe, [a Spanish academic] who had won a big prize, was recently in the news because he could not come back because one of the few reinsertion posts had been cut.

“That is the difficulty with flat cuts. You should cut those things that are not so important, but that is not happening.”


Aid cuts decried by students’ union


However, it seems that the reforms, put forward in February, may be delayed while the Education Ministry fights other battles, particularly over a proposal to introduce higher grade requirements for university students claiming financial aid.

Student groups have argued that the plan under discussion could prevent as many as 83,000 young people from attending university and could cause more than 30,000 students now in the system to lose their grants as richer self-funded students gain admission on lower marks.

“The ministry wants to set up two doors for us to enter our higher education system – one for the rich and one for the poor,” says Inés Sánchez, secretary general of CREUP, Spain’s national students’ union.

Nevertheless, Garicano argues that raising tuition fees – a proposal he made to the review panel, which rejected it as unpalatable – might be the best way to address the woes of Spain’s universities.

Garicano, co-founder of Nada es Gratis (“No Free Lunch”), a blog dedicated to economic analysis of Spain’s problems, says a UK-style system of income-contingent repayable loans and grants would help to establish Spain as a global player in higher education.

“Students should be the first ones to realise the system right now is not preparing them properly for the world,” he says.



Wednesday, July 31, 2013

The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (March 2012)

Occasional Paper 94, March 2012

European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs

You can read the full report here.

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

US Supreme Court: FISHER. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–345. Argued October 10, 2012—Decided June 24, 2013

The University of Texas at Austin considers race as one of various fac­tors in its undergraduate admissions process. The University, which is committed to increasing racial minority enrollment, adopted its current program after this Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, upholding the use of race as one of many “plus factors” in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contri­bution of each candidate, and decided Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, holding unconstitutional an admissions program that automati­cally awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities. Petitioner, who is Caucasian, was rejected for admission to the University’s 2008 entering class. She sued the University and school officials, alleging that the University’s consideration of race in admis­sions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment to the University. Affirming, the Fifth Circuit held that Grutter required courts to give substantial defer­ence to the University, both in the definition of the compelling inter­est in diversity’s benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Applying that standard, the court upheld the University’s admissions plan. (... full text)

Monday, June 10, 2013

IMF: GREECE: EX POST EVALUATION OF EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS UNDER THE 2010 STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT

June 2013, International Monetary Fund
IMF Country Report No. 13/156

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The primary objective of Greece’s May 2010 program supported by a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was to restore market confidence and lay the foundations for sound medium-term growth through strong and sustained fiscal consolidation and deep structural reforms, while safeguarding financial sector stability and reducing the risk of international systemic spillovers. Greece was to stay in the euro area and an estimated 20-30 percent competitiveness gap would be addressed through wage adjustment and productivity gains.

There were notable successes during the SBA-supported program (May 2010–March 2012). Strong fiscal consolidation was achieved and the pension system was put on a viable footing. Greece remained in the euro area, which was its stated political preference. Spillovers that might have had a severe effect on the global economy were relatively well-contained, aided by multilateral efforts to build firewalls.

However, there were also notable failures. Market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30 percent of its deposits, and the economy encountered a much-deeper-than-expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment. Public debt remained too high and eventually had to be restructured, with collateral damage for bank balance sheets that were also weakened by the recession. Competitiveness improved somewhat on the back of falling wages, but structural reforms stalled and productivity gains proved elusive.

Given the danger of contagion, the report judges the program to have been a necessity, even though the Fund had misgivings about debt sustainability. There was, however, a tension between the need to support Greece and the concern that debt was not sustainable with high probability (a condition for exceptional access). In response, the exceptional access criterion was amended to lower the bar for debt sustainability in systemic cases. The baseline still showed debt to be sustainable, as is required for all Fund programs. In the event, macro outcomes were far below the baseline and while some of this was due to exogenous factors, the baseline macro projections can also be criticized for being too optimistic.

The report considers the broad thrust of policies under the program to have been appropriate. Rapid fiscal adjustment was unavoidable given that the Greece had lost market access and official financing was as large as politically feasible. Competiveness-boosting measures were also essential, as were fiscal structural reforms to support deficit reduction. However, the depth of ownership of the program and the capacity to implement structural reforms were overestimated.

Greece’s SBA suggests the need to explore the case for refining the Fund’s lending policies and framework to better accommodate the circumstances of monetary unions. A particular challenge is to find ways to translate promises of conditional assistance from partner countries into formal program agreements.

There are also political economy lessons to be learned. Greece’s recent experience demonstrates the importance of spreading the burden of adjustment across different strata of society in order to build support for a program. The obstacles encountered in implementing reforms also illustrate the critical importance of ownership of a program, a lesson that is common to the findings of many previous EPEs.

Other lessons drawn concern the need to find ways to streamline the Troika process in the future and for Fund staff to be more skeptical about official data during regular surveillance. The detailed nature of the structural fiscal conditionality in the Greek program also bears scrutiny given the premium attached to parsimony in Fund conditionality.  (...Full report)

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

Comparison of salaries of University Professors around the world


This is the best information available I have found, so far.  
 

Introduction

The following sections present comparative data on salaries. After some general obervations about the relation between salaries and the organisation of university systems in different countries, we provide figures for different countries in absolute terms, adjusted to the cost of living and compared to GDP per capita. We also show salary progression by experience and gender.
These sections are constantly being updated with new information, given the wide interest in salary issues. As with all the ACO web pages, we invite you to send us comments and useful information and links on salaries in academia. To comment contact us by email.
 

Information on salaries across countries

Comparing salaries across countries requires some preliminary observations. Salary levels vary both across and within countries. Depending on national legislation and university governance, salary levels can be either fixed rigidly by the state or decided by universities.
In 2007, Bruegel calculated 'setting autonomy' by ten European countries and assigned values between 0 and 1. Many countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Switzerland) had no autonomy (0). Sweden was the country with the highest autonomy (1), and The Netherlands (0.2), Denmark (0.5) and the UK (0.8) are located in between. The total for the ten European was 0.3 (Bruegel, 2007: 5).
Another issue is salary dispersion. There may be significant variations of salary at entry-level positions in universities in systems where universities are more or less free to set their own wages. Even within the same system salaries may vary according to seniority and/or merit. In systems where salaries progress mainly with seniority this progression is visible and can be measured. This is not true in those countries where salaries are fixed according to merit (e.g. record of publications).
In liberalised systems where universities are free to set their own wages, salary growth can be influenced not only by the dynamics of internal competition in the academic market, but also by external competition by non-academic agents, including private economic actors.
Overall, we can say that salaries are higher in systems where either 1) universities are autonomous, compete in the academic market and use salaries to attract and build a strong faculty, or 2) the state fixes high salaries. The UK and the US are typical examples of the first model. Switzerland is a good example of the second model. Universities from these three countries also dominate in the Shangai system for ranking universities.
 

Average gross salaries

The table below provides a comparison of avarage gross salaries across countires. Titles of academic positions differ form country to country but for means of comparison we have unified them into five categories. In countries where the position or its equivalent does not exist, the space is left blank. For more information on salaries as well as the start and maximum salary level, follow the link to the individual country pages.
Note that Ph.D. Candidate is included as a position, even though it is mostly in the Scadinavian countries that Ph.D. Candidates are considered employees with contractual rights equivalent to other academic positions.

 


Average Gross Salaries, €/month


PhD

Postdoc
Junior Lecturer/
Assistant Professor
Senior Lecturer/
Associate Professor

Full
Professor
Belgium (2007)
--
--
4.318
5.138
6.625
Canada (2007)
--
--
4.856
6.096
7.145
Denmark (2007)
3.152
4.560
--
5.499
6.974
Finland (2007)
2.290
3.220
--
3.420
5.218
France (2007)
--
2.500
--
3.000
4.500
Germany (2007)
--
--
3.277
3.744
4.546
Ireland (2004)
--
--
5.250
6.400/7.700*
9.750
Israel (2007)
--
--
2.650
3.029/3.597*
4.733
Italy (2004)
--
1.500
2.500
4.000
5.500
Netherlands (2004)
--
--
3.974
5.541
6.544
Norway (2005)
3.203
3.950
--
4.330
5.297
Poland (2006/2007)
--
--
586
1.127
1.758
Russia (2007)
250
--
--
600**
900/1.100***
Spain (2003)
--
1.584
2.250
2.750
3.584
Sweden (2006)
2.365
3.317
3.142
3.800
5.145
UK (2007)
--
3.813
4.766
5.842
6.353
Ukraine (2006)
50
100
200
400
1.000
USA (2006)
--
3.708
4.820
5.785
8.529
 
* These figures refer to respectively 'senior lecturer' and 'associate professor' positions.
** This figure refers to the undifferentiated 'lecturer' position.
** These figures refer to respectively the 'professor' and 'chair' positions.
 
All figures are gross. For taxing comparisons see: http://www.oecd.org. All countries provide different social benefits, social security, child care, family allowance, etc, to their citizens.
The salaries are provided by institutions or ministries in the respective countries.
For more detailed information salary levels see the individual country links.
Note that in the different countries there are various ways to top the salary with bonuses and other means of income. This is especially true in the case of Spain and the U.S. where the salaries comparatively seem very low, but the actual salary can be much higher depending on the productivity and outside activities of the individual.

In April 2007 the European Commission published a comparison of researchers salaries across Europe, based on an online survey. The following chart gives the average salaries adjusted to the cost of living in each country:

Average weighted total yearly salary per countries (2006 in €) 
Country Average weighted total yearly salary adjusted Country Average weighted total yearly salary adjusted
Austria 62.406 Latvia 10.488
Belgium 58.462 Lithuania 13.851
Bulgaria 3.556 Luxembourg 63.865
Croatia 16.671 Malta 28.078
Cyprus 45.039 Netherlands 59.103
Czech Republic 19.620 Norway 58.997
Denmark 61.355 Poland 11.659
Estonia 11.748 Portugal 29.001
Finland 44.635 Romania 6.286
France 50.879 Slovakia 9.178
Germany 56.132 Slovenia 27.756
Greece 25.685 Spain 34.908
Hungary 15.812 Sweden 56.053
Iceland 50.803 Switzerland 82.725
Ireland 60.727 Turkey 16.249
Israel 42.552 United Kingdom 56.048
Italy 36.201
 
Source: European Commission, 2007: 43.

The report found bropad differences between salaries in the EU and associated countries, which however were reduced once salaries were adjusted to the cost of living in each country. As expected, countries with a high cost of living were those that paid researchers better. Low-medium salary levels were reported in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region, while high-very high salaries were paid in Central Europe and the Nordic countries.
A few countries (Austria, The Netherlands, Israel, Switzerland and Luxembourg) offered avarage salaries in line with the U.S. considering the cost of living.
Other countries outside the EU (Australia, India, Japan) all have average higher remuneration than the EU-25 area considering the cost of living. In Australia and Japan salaries are similar to those of the U.S. The only country in which the average salary was well below the EU was China.
See the report for further info
 

Salaries compared to GDP per capita

The ratio between the average salary for researchers and the average GDP per capita (adjusted to the cost of living) varies from country to country. Data show different degrees of investment on research by different countries. For example, with declining values Japan, the UK and the US all provide researchers with salaries higher than their country GDP per capita. Spain and Sweden pay around the same as the average GDP, and Italy pays less.



Click here to see the graph



Salary progression by experience and gender

The table draws on the Commission's study and reports researchers' annual salary average in the EU and associated countries by gender and years of experience.
The table draws on the Commission's study and reports researchers' annual salary average in the EU and associated countries by gender and years of experience.
Total country annualy salary of researchers in EU25 and associated countries, by gender and level of experience (2006, all currencies in purchasing power parities)
 
Country/years
of experience
(by gender)
 0-4 y.
Female
Male
 5-7 y.
Female
Male
 8-10 y.
Female
Male
 11-15 y.
Female
Male
 >15 y.
Female
Male
Austria 34.473   
37.244
41.921    
50.446
49.369    
63.648
56.817    
76.850
64.266    
90.052
Belgium 27.767
26.802
35.079
40.933
42.392
55.064
49.705
69.195
57.018
83.326
Bulgaria 2.045
1.961
2.668
2.689
3.292
3.417
3.915
4.144
4.539
4.872
Croatia 9.862
9.458
12.665
12.124
15.468
15.541
18.270
19.922
21.073
25.537
Cyprus 22.234
21.208
28.051
32.147
33.867
43.086
39.684
54.025
45.500
64.964
Czech
Republic
7.478
10.728
10.792
15.015
14.105
19.301
17.419
23.587
20.733
27.874
Denmark 43.117
42.852
51.460
52.204
59.804
61.556
68.147
70.908
76.490
80.260
Estonia 4.825
7.691
6.939
10.068
7.636
12.444
8.334
14.821
9.053
17.198
Finland 23.369
28.886
29.776
36.724
36.182
44.563
42.589
52.401
48.996
60.239
France 30.223
30.726
38.859
39.225
47.494
50.075
56.129
63.926
64.765
81.608
Germany 22.143
25.716
35.969
38.731
49.795
51.746
63.621
64.761
77.447
77.776
Greece 13.462
11.823
19.131
18.370
24.800
24.917
30.469
31.464
36.138
38.011
Hungary 6.902
10.706
10.152
13.244
13.401
15.783
16.650
18.322
19.899
20.861
Iceland 45.664
44.713
50.070
50.073
52.273
55.432
54.475
60.792
58.881
66.152
Ireland 26.428
20.290
39.691
41.073
52.954
61.856
66.217
82.639
79.480
103.422
Israel 16.329
13.523
22.407
20.453
28.486
30.933
34.564
46.783
40.643
70.754
Italy 12.244
12.760
19.777
23.488
27.310
34.216
34.844
44.944
42.377
55.672
Latvia 12.000
-
14.667
-
17.335
-
20.002
-
22.670
-
Lithuania 7.356
6.836
8.286
9.068
9.216
11.299
10.146
13.531
11.076
15.763
Luxembourg 24.742
43.578
40.365
53.864
55.988
64.150
71.611
74.436
87.234
84.722
Malta 24.364
21.364
27.267
23.746
30.169
26.393
33.071
29.336
35.974
32.606
Netherlands 22.518
31.921
35.655
47.095
48.792
62.269
61.929
77.443
75.066
92.617
Norway 49.031
52.829
54.174
58.346
59.316
63.864
64.459
69.381
69.602
74.898
Poland 5.921
8.453
8.088
10.166
10.255
12.226
12.421
14.703
14.588
17.682
Portugal 10.512
12.051
14.693
17.541
20.535
25.532
28.702
37.164
40.115
54.095
Romania 3.813
2.476
4.696
4.474
5.785
6.473
7.126
8.472
8.778
10.471
Slovakia 5.547
5.895
6.794
7.187
8.041
8.762
9.287
10.681
10.534
13.021
Slovenia 16.424
17.976
22.502
22.372
28.581
27.844
34.659
34.654
40.737
43.130
Spain 16.416
17.228
22.858
22.955
29.300
30.586
35.742
40.754
42.184
54.301
Sweden 28.591
28.012
41.900
42.655
55.209
57.298
68.518
71.941
81.827
86.584
Sweden 28.591
28.012
41.900
42.655
55.209
57.298
68.518
71.941
81.827
86.584
Switzerland 39.599
40.862
55.711
61.075
71.823
81.288
87.935
101.501
104.047
121.714
Turkey 7.674
8.634
10.707
11.387
13.740
15.016
16.773
19.803
19.806
26.116
United
Kingdom
25.411
29.060
37.461
38.608
49.511
51.293
61.561
68.146
73.611
90.536
 
Source: European Commission, 2007: 47

Here too the report found wide differences between countries. For example, in the UK one can expect a high progression moving from the first (0-4) to the last (>15) stage of the career stages considered by the report. At the same time, Denmark offers higher salaries already in the first stage but progression is limited (around 90%) compared to the UK (around 235%).
Women earn less than men, with significant differences in all the countries. In some (Estonia, Czech Republic, Israel and Portugal) the gap is above 35%. In others (Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Malta) it is below 15%.
See the report for more info.
 

Bibliography

Bruegel (2007), 'Why Reform Europe's Universities?', Policy Brief Series, 2007/04.
European Commission (2007), Study on the Remuneration of Researchers in the Public and Private Commercial Sectors (pdf).


Salaries in Economics in US Academia 2010-11

 
 

Introduction

The American academic market for young economists is undoubtedly the most interesting and sought after. Salary packages are competitive in most universities, and not necessarily in the top-ranked ones.
Each year, The American Economic Association sends out to selected institutions the Universal Academic Questionnaire (UAQ), an annual survey of US economics departments. The American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings includes a few tables assembled from the latest UAQ responses. Even though the accuracy of these results depends on the willingness of individual departments to collaborate, it is, nonetheless, a good indication of the working conditions to be expected in the American job market for economists.
All the figures in the tables below refer to academic-year salaries (calendar-year salaries are converted into academic-year salaries by multiplying by 0.818) and in USD. 1 USD = 0.734 Euros on 28 September 2011. The number of surveyed institutions is indicated in round parentheses; satndard deviations for salaries in square parentheses.
 

Salaries of tenure-track academic economists by degree-granting institution

The US academic market for economics is highly segmented and either focuses on teaching activities (institutions granting mainly BA and MA degrees) or on research activities as well (most institutions granting PhD degrees).
The Table below shows the salaries of tenured faculty at different institutions, based on the highest degree awarded in economics. Of course, universities granting research-based degrees (PhD) attract the most talented economists and offer the best salary packages.

US academic-year salaries of tenure-track academic economists
(2010-11)

   Full Prof Associate Prof  Assistant Prof
PhD Institutions  $159,816 (76)
[$41,772]
$117,231 (76)
[$30,821] 
$100,451 (83)
[$13,471] 
 MA Institutions  $106,953 (33)
[$14,998]
$84,803 (31)
[$12,429] 
$79,492 (40)
[$11,743] 
 BA Institutions  $103,262 (148)
[$23,987]
$80,382 (30)
[$14,571] 
$74,677 (37)
[$15,393]

Salaries of Associate and Full Professors at PhD-granting institutions

The National Research Council (NRC) rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into tiers. The top three tiers include:
  • Tier 1 (ranked 1-6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford and Yale;
  • Tier 2 (ranked 7-15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Rochester, California-Berkeley, UCLA, and Wisconsin-Madison;
  • Tier 3 (ranked 16-30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell, Duke, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan State, New York University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia, California-San Diego, University of Washington, and Washington University-St. Louis.
Not unsurprisingly, as the Table below shows, the lower Tier (lower numbers), the lower the average salary.

US academic-year salaries of tenure-track Associate and Full Professors in PhD granting universities by NRC Tiers (2010-11)


  Full Prof  Associate Prof 
Tiers 1-2 (ranks 1-15)   $224,010 (6)
[$47,750]
$151,417 (5)
[$46,188]
 Tier 3 (ranks 16-30)  $180,518 (8)
[$29,605]
$133,932 (8)
[$34,314] 
 Tier 4 (ranks 31-48)  $171,024 (9)
[$38,446]
$131,678 (9)
[$27,492]
 Tier 5 (ranks 49+)  $140,714 (45)
[$26,216]
$104,758 (42)
[$17,791]


Employment conditions for new Assistant Professors

The Table below provides a fuller description of the employment conditions of newly hired Assistant Professors at US academic institutions offering different degrees in economics. In addition to the salary, compensations include: guaranteed summer compensation (over all years), other cash benefits to employees, such as a signing bonus. They do not include fringe benefits, moving expenses, computer that remains the property of the institution. Finally, the Table also summarizes the teaching load for each new Assistant Professor (courses per year), which is inversely correlated to the highest degree on offer.

Employment conditions for new Assistant Professors (2010-11)


   Salary Add. compensation Teaching load 
 PhD Institutions $111,878 (83)
[$28,422] 
$39,378 (81)
[$21,423] 
3.5 (86)
[2.4] 
 MA Institutions  $83,834 (26)
[$10,659]
$14,333 (7)
[$10,571] 
4.6 (35)
[0.7] 
 BA Institutions  $73,431 (10)
[$12,660]
$4,214 (9)
[$2,644] 
5.8 (11)
[1.4] 

References

Scott, C. S. and Siegfried, J. J. (2011): “American Economic Association Universal Academic Questionnaire Summary Statistics”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 101 (664–667).